Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs)
January 2011

Spontaneous Recognition Memory Measured by Performance in a
Memory Stroop Paradigm
Benjamin Anderson
Washington University in St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Anderson, Benjamin, "Spontaneous Recognition Memory Measured by Performance in a Memory Stroop
Paradigm" (2011). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 19.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/19

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington
University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Psychology

Dissertation Committee:
Larry L. Jacoby, Chair
David A. Balota
Todd S. Braver
Brian D. Carpenter
James V. Wertsch

SPONTANEOUS RECOGNTION MEMORY MEASURED
BY PERFORMANCE IN A MEMORY STROOP PARADIGM
by
Benjamin Axel Anderson

A dissertation presented to the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2011
Saint Louis, Missouri

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

iii

List of Tables

iv

List of Figures

vii

Abstract

viii

Introduction

1

Controlled and Automatic Processes: Retrieval Constraint

6

Results from Prior Investigations of Involuntary Memory

9

Preliminary Research on Spontaneous Recognition

12

Overview of Experiments

17

Experiment 1: Pure vs. Mixed Retrieval Constraint

22

Methods

25

Results & Discussion

27

Experiment 2: Effects of Fluency on Spontaneous Recognition

40

Methods

43

Results & Discussion

44

Experiment 3: Effects of Source Constrained Retrieval on Spontaneous Recognition

49

Methods

52

Results & Discussion

56

General Discussion

73

References

82

ii

Acknowledgements
There are several people that I would like to thank for their help throughout the
experience of developing and completing this dissertation. First of all, my advisor Larry
Jacoby has been instrumental in helping me shape the ideas that led to the included
experiments. Larry and my other core committee members, Dave Balota and Todd
Braver have provided excellent feedback throughout this process on ways to interpret and
follow up on these results. I would also like to thank my other committee members,
Brian Carpenter and James Wertsch for their time in reading and providing feedback on
the dissertation. The Jacoby Lab, particularly Ruthann Thomas, Chad Rogers, and
Christopher Walheim have been great to work with throughout the past few years.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their help in getting through the
stressful times and for their insightful discussions on the nature of involuntary memory in
everyday life.

iii

List of Tables
Table 1. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter, Test
Type, and Group in Experiment 2 from Anderson et al. (in press).

14

Table 2: Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter, and
Stimulus Type in the Preliminary Experiment Involving Mixed Test Conditions.

16

Table 3a. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
Stimulus Type, and Test Condition in Experiment 1. Table 3b.

29

Table 3b. Response Time (in ms) as a Function of Target, Distracter, Stimulus Type, and
Test Condition in Experiment 1.

32

Table 4a. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
Stimulus Type, and Switch Type in Experiment 1.

36

Table 4b. Response Time (in ms) as a Function of Target, Distracter, Stimulus Type, and
Switch Type in Experiment 1.

38

Table 5. Experiment 2 Test Item Types

42

Table 6a. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
and Stimulus Type in Experiment 2.

45

Table 6b. Response Time (in ms) as a Function of Target, Distracter, and Stimulus Type
in Experiment 2.

48

Table 7. Experiment 3 Test Item Types.

54

Table 8a. Probability of Judging Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.

58

iv

Table 8b. Probability of Judging Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.

58

Table 9a. Probability of Judging Non-Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of
Target List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.

61

Table 9b. Probability of Judging Non-Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of
Target List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.

61

Table 10a. Probability of Judging New Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.

63

Table 10b. Probability of Judging New Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.

63

Table 11a. Response Time (in ms) to Source Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.

67

Table 11b. Response Time (in ms) to Source Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment 3. 67
Table 12a. Response Time (in ms) to Non-Source Target Items as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.

69

v

Table 12b. Response Time (in ms) to Non-Source Target Items as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.

69

Table 13a. Response Time (in ms) to New Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.

71
Table 13b. Response Time (in ms) to New Target Items as a Function of Target List,

Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment 3. 71

vi

List of Figures
Figure 1. Schematic of the Memory Stroop task. Participants study a series of
pictures and words and are then asked to make recognition decisions on the picture
or word during separate test blocks. The example test stimuli represent the four item
types that crossed old or new words with old or new pictures. The correct response
to each of these items depended upon whether the recognition target was the picture
or the word, as instructions indicated prior to each test block.
5

vii

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Spontaneous Recognition Memory Measured by
Performance in a Memory Stroop Paradigm
by
Benjamin Axel Anderson
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2011
Professor Larry L. Jacoby, Chair

Studies of recognition memory have generally involved tests in which the
participant‟s memory is directly questioned. There are occasions, however, in which
memory is more spontaneous in nature (e.g., recognizing an acquaintance out of context).
The current studies investigated spontaneous recognition memory through the use of a
memory Stroop paradigm, which involved study of pictures and words followed by
recognition memory decisions on either the picture or word component of stimuli with an
old or new word superimposed over an old or new picture. Spontaneous recognition was
measured by comparing the influence of old as compared to new distracters on the
probability of responding “old” to target items. The primary aim of the current studies
was to explore the relationship between retrieval constraint and spontaneous recognition
of distracting information. The results revealed that spontaneous recognition was more
likely to occur when retrieval was less constrained to goal relevant information as a result
of having to switch between decisions on pictures and words. In contrast, when
participants were placed under testing conditions that allowed consistent decisions to be

viii

made on the same stimulus type, spontaneous recognition was not revealed. The results
also yielded partial evidence to suggest that spontaneous recognition may be more likely
to occur when the distracter is made more fluent as a result of having been repeated
during study. Finally, a manipulation involving differential constraint of memory search
to the list source in which items were originally studied yielded marginally significant
effects, such that source constraint to a particular list target was associated with increased
processing of distracters belonging to the list being constrained to. Taken together, the
results suggest that spontaneous recognition may be more likely to occur when demands
are placed on controlled processing and that spontaneous recognition may be
qualitatively modulated by the way control is being oriented in one‟s environment.
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Spontaneous Recognition Memory Measured by Performance in a Memory Stroop
Paradigm
Ebbinghaus (1885) distinguished between voluntary memory, the intentional
retrieval of information, and involuntary memory, which occurs “…without any act of the
will…”. He further stated, “As more exact observation teaches us, the occurrence of these
involuntary reproductions is not an entirely random and accidental one. On the contrary
they are brought about through the instrumentality of other, immediately presented
mental images” (1885/1964, p. 2).
Although memory researchers have typically investigated voluntary memory by
directly asking people to recall or recognize studied items, involuntary memory is
common and at least as important as voluntary memory in daily life. As a commonplace
example, one might encounter an acquaintance and spontaneously recognize him/her
without memory for the acquaintance being directly questioned. There may be important
differences between the memory processes underlying spontaneous recognition and
recognition of the same acquaintance if memory had been directly questioned. The most
obvious difference is that voluntary memory involves the attempt to remember whereas
involuntary memory is more heavily driven by the stimulus. The goal of this thesis is to
further explore the relation between spontaneous recognition memory and recognition
memory that is directed by instructions.
Involuntary memory may be thought of as a more automatic as compared to a
controlled memory process in that it occurs without intention. Mandler (1980) described
encountering an acquaintance in a novel context (viz., his butcher on a bus) to illustrate
the distinction between the experience of familiarity in “knowing” the acquaintance from
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somewhere and the retrieval attempt directed toward identifying the acquaintance.
Although much research has explored how familiarity influences recognition memory
performance when the participant has an explicit goal to remember (e.g., Jacoby, 1991;
Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley,1989), the “butcher on the bus” example demonstrates a
type of spontaneous recognition memory which appears to be involuntary. In that
example, the spontaneous recognition of the acquaintance captures attention (c.f., James,
1890; Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & Dewitt, 1990), whereas familiarity in a
recognition test occurs when attention is focused on the direct memory task. The two
forms of familiarity might differ in that only the familiarity accompanying spontaneous
recognition occurs without intention.
Measuring spontaneous recognition memory requires a means of assessing
recognition of an item without directly asking participants to engage in a memory search.
Previous research on implicit memory (for a review, see Roediger, 1990) employed
“indirect” memory tests to reveal the influence of prior experience when a person has not
been directed to engage in voluntary memory. For example, reading a word enhances
later perceptual identification of the word when it is briefly flashed, even when the word
is not recognized as having been earlier studied (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Although
indirect tests of this sort reveal a use of memory that is unintentional, they do not provide
a measure of spontaneous recognition memory. This is because effects of memory on
such tests are often not accompanied by awareness of the past. To measure spontaneous
recognition, the subjective experience of “oldness” for an item should influence
performance on the indirect test of memory.

2

There is little work exploring the dynamics of involuntary recognition memory in
the laboratory. However, although not discussed as such, Eriksen, Eriksen, and
Hoffman‟s (1986) use of a “flanker” procedure highlighted the distinction between
spontaneous and directed recognition memory. In a procedure designed to investigate
memory search processes, they presented sets of letters followed by a memory test that
required participants to judge whether a probe letter was presented in the most recent set.
The probe letter was flanked by either old letters from the memory set or new letters.
Importantly, participants were instructed to ignore the flanking letters and base their
judgment solely on the oldness of the probe letter. However, the oldness of the flanker
influenced recognition of the probe. The memory judgment on the probe letter was
slowed when it was surrounded by an incongruent flanker (e.g., an old probe letter
flanked by new letters) compared to a congruent flanker (e.g., an old probe letter flanked
by old letters). Further, there was a dissociation between directed and spontaneous
recognition in the effect of memory set sizes on performance. Larger memory sets were
associated with reduced recognition of the probe letter, but memory set size did not
change the effect of flanker oldness on memory. The effect of flanking letters was said to
be produced by their familiarity, which was independent of the memory search that was
engaged to recognize probe letters.
In a study designed to investigate spontaneous recognition more directly, Ste.
Marie and Jacoby (1993) used a similar flanker paradigm that involved words instead of
letters. Spontaneous recognition was measured by comparing the influence of old
compared to new flanker words on accuracy and response time of recognition judgments
for the target word. That is, if the flanking word was spontaneously recognized as being
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old, then it should influence processing of the target word. The experiments included full
and divided attention conditions during the recognition test to examine whether attention
influenced the likelihood that spontaneous recognition would occur. Results showed that
the oldness of the flankers had no influence on either response time or accuracy of
performance when full attention was given to the recognition memory test. However,
when attention was divided, spontaneous recognition was evidenced by results showing
that response time was faster when the oldness of the target and flanker was congruent
(e.g., old target paired with old compared to new distracter) and slowed when the oldness
of the target was incongruent with the distracter (e.g., new target paired with old
compared to new distracter). Taken together, prior investigations by Eriksen, Eriksen, &
Hoffman (1986) and Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) suggest that spontaneous recognition
may be assessed via the indirect influence of the distracting information on a target
decision.
The current studies further investigated spontaneous recognition by assessing
whether the ability to constrain retrieval would influence the contribution of distracting
stimuli to recognition memory decisions in a novel picture-word interference paradigm.
Participants first studied a series of pictures and words followed by a memory test with
each trial displaying an old or new word superimposed over an old or new picture.
Participants were instructed to make their recognition decision on either the picture or
word and to ignore the distracting stimulus (see Figure 1). As in Ste. Marie and Jacoby
(1993), the primary measure for spontaneous recognition was the influence of an old
compared to a new distracter on target processing. Recognition memory of the distracter
is thought to be spontaneous with its effect being automatic in the same way that word-
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Figure 1. Memory Stroop Task
Study Phase

Recognition Test Phase
Correct Response

Study Stimuli

Test Stimuli

Item Type

Word Test

Picture Test

Table

House

New Word
New Picture

“New”

“New”

New Word
Old Picture

“New”

“Old”

Old Word
New Picture

“Old”

“New”

Old Word
Old Picture

“Old”

“Old”

Tiger

Carrot

Table

Tiger

5

reading influences color naming in the color-word Stroop (1935) task. Results from the
Stroop task show that naming the ink color is slowed when the color word is incongruent
(e.g., the word “red” in green ink) as compared to congruent (e.g., the word “red” in red
ink) with the correct response (for a review, see McLeod, 1991). As in the color-word
Stroop task, the irrelevant feature of the stimulus is expected to influence judgment of the
target in the current paradigm. That is, spontaneous recognition of an old distracter was
expected to lead to interference when paired with a new target (i.e., incongruent
condition) and facilitation when paired with an old target (i.e., congruent condition).
Consequently, I refer to our test of spontaneous recognition as a “Memory Stroop” task.
In the following, I briefly review literature aimed at specifying how intention to
remember has its effect. As will be argued, a better understanding of voluntary memory
is a prerequisite for understanding involuntary memory of the sort revealed by
spontaneous recognition. Next, I return to techniques of measuring involuntary memory
and review prior work that examined spontaneous recognition memory. I then introduce
the current experiments done for my thesis, providing further review of the existing
literature in the context of those experiments.
Controlled vs. Automatic Processes: Retrieval Orientation.
Controlled processes are generally described as intentional, capacity limited, and
“in charge” of the allocation of lower processing resources to goal relevant features of a
task (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988, Jacoby, 1991; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In the
context of memory, controlled processes involve searching the contents of memory for
information relevant to the task at hand and excluding irrelevant information (e.g.,
Buckner, 2003). The ability to employ control is influenced by dividing attention or
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having participants switch between task goals. Manipulations such as these lead to
decreased ability to avoid interference from distracters as well as decreased ability to
direct memory toward source or contextual information (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000;
Yonelinas, 2002). In sum, the controlled processing characteristics of intention and
constraint are at the core of what is considered to be voluntary memory.
The defining characteristics of automatic processes tend to be less agreed upon.
In general, disagreements involve whether or not automatic processes are purely stimulus
driven, are accompanied by awareness, and whether they are entirely divorced from
intention (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Kinoshita, 2001; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995;
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). The vast amount of research providing evidence for and
against these claims is beyond the scope of the current thesis but will be briefly
considered when returning to questions about spontaneous recognition. The approach that
I take toward relating automaticity to involuntary and voluntary memory is to consider
how automatic processing depends upon how control is being directed, an idea which will
be referred to as the “relativity of automaticity” (see Allport, 1989; Folk, Remington, &
Johnston, 1992; Neumann, 1984; Ste. Marie & Jacoby, 1993).
The construct of “retrieval orientation” incorporates the processes of preparing to
retrieve a particular target from memory and maintaining memory retrieval toward such
targets for an extended period of time (Rugg & Wilding, 2000; Tulving, 1983). When
retrieval is not effectively focused toward a particular source, irrelevant information from
other sources may be processed, leading to increased retrieval demands and decreased
performance. Much of the work on retrieval orientation has utilized neuroimaging to
isolate networks that are associated with control during memory retrieval. For example, a
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recent study conducted by Woodruff, Uncapher, and Rugg (2006) used a mixed design to
investigate item and state level neural activation when focusing retrieval decisions toward
a particular stimulus type. Their task involved studying words and pictures followed by
recognition test blocks which presented a cue instructing participants to orient retrieval
toward either pictures or words. The rationale was that orienting and maintaining
retrieval to a particular stimulus type during test should bias processing of the retrieval
toward the current goal. Results were consistent with the idea of encoding specificity
(Tulving & Thompson, 1973) such that orienting retrieval to pictures led to greater
recruitment of picture processing areas (e.g., left BA 37) and orienting to words led to
greater activation in word processing areas at both sustained and item levels. That is, the
controlled process of preparing and maintaining retrieval toward a cued stimulus type led
to increased activation of top down areas which allowed for selective recruitment of the
task relevant processing areas.
Other research has also considered variation of control processes during retrieval
as reflecting qualitatively different ways of using memory. This work has emphasized
the extent to which memory is directed toward contextual information compared to using
familiarity to decide whether something is old (e.g., Dobbins & Han, 2006). Along these
lines, source constrained retrieval has considered differential retrieval constraints as
being reliant on a controlled (recollection) rather than an automatic (familiarity) process
as a proactive basis for directing recognition memory search. The importance of this
work comes in showing that age differences in memory are potentially due to older adults
not directing memory toward source information, instead using a fluency or familiarity
based decision (e.g., Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005).
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Moscovitch and Melo (1997) distinguished between strategic processes taking
place pre-retrieval (or “at input”) and post-retrieval (or “at output”). Along similar lines,
Burgess and Shallice (1996) put forward a schematic model that includes a pre-retrieval
descriptor process, which specifies attributes of the solicited trace (cf. Norman &
Bobrow, 1979), as well as post-retrieval editing and evaluation processes. Based on their
findings, Moscovitch and Melo (1997) and Burgess and Shallice (1996) concluded that
both pre- and post-retrieval deficits can contribute to confabulation. Some progress has
been made toward specifying the contributions of retrieval processes in preventing wrong
information from coming to mind, as opposed to the contribution of post-retrieval
monitoring processes in rejecting such information (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & McElree,
1999; Jacoby, et al., 2005). In a similar vein, Braver and colleagues (e.g., Braver et al.
2005; Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008) have sought to separate “proactive” (preretrieval) processes from “reactive” (post-retrieval) processes that serve to resolve
response conflicts. This work emphasizes the importance of goal maintenance in the
biasing of retrieval toward task relevant information. Results from these lines suggest
that proactive control is more effective than reactive control in allowing one to avoid
interference from distracting information.
Returning to the issue of involuntary memory, the nature of cognitive control that
is exercised might be an important determinant of involuntary memory. For example, if
processing is sufficiently constrained by the demands of an ongoing task, involuntary
memory may not occur.
Results from Prior Investigations of Involuntary Memory
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The dynamics of involuntary memory have only recently been investigated,
primarily in the context of autobiographical recall. The bulk of this work has been done
using self report and diary studies in which the participant is asked to report when
involuntary memories occur and describe what they were doing at that time (e.g.,
Berntsen, 2007; Mace, 2006). These studies show that involuntary autobiographical
memories tend to be specific, externally driven by people, activities, objects, locations,
topics, etc., and typically occur while in a non-focused state (e.g., Berntsen, 2007;
Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). Despite the growing area of research on involuntary
autobiographical recall that has recently developed, little work has been directly aimed
toward experimentally investigating the dynamics of involuntary recognition memory
(Anderson, Jacoby, Thomas, & Balota, in press; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993). In line
with the involuntary autobiographical studies, this work also highlights the importance
of a non-focused state for the occurrence of involuntary memory.
Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) used a flanker paradigm to measure spontaneous
recognition memory in which old/new target words were presented centrally and flanked
by old/new distracter words (c.f., Eriksen, Eriksen, & Hoffman, 1986). The rationale for
this design was that involuntary memory can‟t be measured by asking a direct question
regarding its prior occurrence. Spontaneous recognition was therefore measured as the
influence of the old compared to new flanker word on the target word accuracy and
reaction time. That is, if the flanking or distracter word was spontaneously recognized as
being old, then it should influence processing of the target word. The experiments
included full vs. divided attention conditions during test to examine how attention
influenced the tendency for spontaneous recognition to occur. Further, the relationship
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between the targets and distracters was manipulated by 1) increasing fluency via
repeating words during study, and 2) incorporating different source modalities (heard vs.
read). Fluency and modality manipulations set up a comparison between match vs.
mismatch in prior processing between the target and distracter. Crossing these factors
allowed for a test of the relativity of automaticity under which spontaneous recognition
might occur.
Results from these experiments yielded the following conditions under which
spontaneous recognition occurred. First, the oldness of the flankers had no influence on
either reaction time or accuracy performance when full attention was given to the test of
recognition memory. Second, when attention was divided, the time in deciding the
oldness of the target items was facilitated when the oldness of the target and flanker was
congruent (e.g., old target paired with old compared to new distracter) and interfered with
when the oldness of the target was incongruent with the distracter (e.g., new target paired
with old compared to new distracter). Third, a target shown once was less influenced by
the five-times-presented distracter than it was by the one-time-presented distracter,
showing the importance of the match between familiarity of the target and distracter.
Spontaneous recognition was not observed when the targets were fluent from having been
presented multiple times during study. Finally, when subjects studied words in auditory
and visual formats, spontaneous recognition only occurred when there was a match in
prior modality during test (e.g., heard word flanked with heard words).
To summarize these results, spontaneous recognition only seemed to occur when
attention was divided during test and when there was a match in prior processing between
the target and distracter (in modality and repetition). Spontaneous recognition was not
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observed under full attention conditions or for the divided attention condition when the
targets were made fluent through repeated study.
Given the conditions in which prior processing history match was required to yield
spontaneous recognition, these results were interpreted as evidence that spontaneous
recognition is not entirely divorced from the orientation of memory retrieval. Other
research investigating attention has revealed similar patterns. Neumann (1984) suggested
that automatic processes are not independent of one‟s current attentional state. Folk,
Remington, and Johnston (1992) also put forth a theory on the contingent orienting of
attention, which states that an attentional set establishes what is relevant to the current
task demands and determines what type of information is “filtered” or selected for in our
visual environment. In other words, what is distracting is contingent upon the attentional
set or the goal one has at the time. Their idea (akin to Neumann‟s) contrasts with theories
that consider involuntary shifts of attention to be solely stimulus driven.
Preliminary Research on Spontaneous Recognition
Prior behavioral experiments were conducted using a novel picture-word interference
paradigm to investigate how age, attention, and retrieval constraint relate to the tendency
for spontaneous recognition of distracters. The task involved multiple study-test blocks
in which participants studied a series of pictures and words and then made recognition
memory decisions on either the picture or the word component of stimuli consisting of an
old or new word superimposed over an old or new picture (see Figure 1). The oldness of
target and distracter stimuli was crossed in a similar fashion to the Ste. Marie and Jacoby
(1993) study, allowing for either old or new targets to be paired with old or new
distracters. Recall from the Ste. Marie and Jacoby study that the influence of an old
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compared to new distracter on target processing is the index for spontaneous recognition.
Spontaneous recognition was expected to be shown as interference when a new target
was paired with an old rather than new distracter while facilitation was expected when an
old target was paired with an old rather than new distracter.
Anderson et al. (in press) tested the effects of attention and aging on the tendency
for spontaneous recognition of distracting information to occur. Full attention younger
adults completed the recognition memory test as described above. The divided attention
young were asked to monitor a series of auditorily presented digits while simultaneously
completing the recognition memory task. An older adult group was tested under full
attention conditions in order to examine age differences in spontaneous recognition.
Results from Experiment 2 in Anderson et al. (in press) are shown in Table 1.
These findings indicate that when making memory decisions for target pictures or words,
older adults and divided attention younger adults were influenced by the oldness of
distracters. This was shown by the probability of responding “old” to increase when
targets were paired with old as compared to new distracters. Interestingly, the influence
of old distracters found for the divided attention young and the older adults was greater
for recognition decisions to words than to pictures. This result may have been due to the
better memory for the picture information which may have led to greater influence on
memory decisions.
Another experiment was conducted to determine whether retrieval orientation
influences the tendency for spontaneous recognition to occur in younger adults. The
experiment manipulated retrieval orientation by varying the cue to stimulus interval (CSI)
in a within subjects fashion such that in some test blocks participants had 250 ms to
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Table 1. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
Test Type, and Group in Experiment 2 from Anderson et al. (in press).

Group
Full Att. Young
Div. Att. Young
Older Adults
Full Att. Young
Div. Att. Young
Older Adults

Old Target
New Distracter Old Distracter
Picture Trials
.85 (.13)
.87 (.14)
.80 (.14)
.79 (.16)
.91 (.12)
.93 (.08)
Word Trials
.76 (.17)
.75 (.17)
.52 (.18)
.64 (.14)
.65 (.19)
.71 (.21)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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New Target
New Distracter Old Distracter
.07 (.13)
.10 (.06)
.06 (.07)

.05 (.08)
.14 (.10)
.10 (.11)

.09 (.10)
.16 (.13)
.08 (.08)

.09 (.09)
.23 (.15)
.16 (.15)

prepare their response based on the cue (“P” for picture or “W” for word) but had
1500ms to prepare in the other blocks. Another critical change was that participants had
to switch between making decisions on the picture or word during test. Reliable
differences between short and long CSI were not observed. Therefore, results are
collapsed across these conditions.
Results from this second preliminary experiment are displayed in Table 2. Most
important, spontaneous recognition was observed in this experiment for the younger
adults placed under mixed testing conditions. This is most clearly evidenced by the word
trial performance, where the probability of responding “old” was higher for decisions
made to new targets paired with old (.19) as compared to new (.15) distracters and for
decisions made to old targets paired with old (.72) as compared to new (.65) distracters
Post hoc analyses between the two preliminary experiments showed a significant
difference in the influence of old vs. new distracters (p < .01), with greater spontaneous
recognition occurring for the younger adults under mixed, as compared to pure testing
conditions. Note that this comparison is being made between experiments and is not
statistically sound given the lack of random assignment and a priori hypotheses in
comparing test condition (pure vs. blocked). However, the possibility remains that the
younger adults were showing spontaneous recognition when having to switch between
decisions on the picture vs. word component during test. This difference between
blocked and mixed decision during test is interesting considering the impact that
switching between goals during similar tasks has on the ability to control retrieval (e.g.,
Mayr & Kliegl, 2000).
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Table 2. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
and Stimulus Type in the Preliminary Experiment Involving Mixed Test Conditions.

Group
Picture Trials
Word Trials

Old Target
New Distracter Old Distracter
.80 (.16)
.83 (.15)
.65 (.20)
.72 (.18)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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New Target
New Distracter Old Distracter
.10 (.11)
.13 (.12)
.15 (.17)
.19 (.17)

Results across both experiments show that age, divided attention, and target
switching are associated with an increase in spontaneous recognition. The common
theme across these conditions is the decreased ability to control retrieval. Under such
situations of limited control, it is likely that individuals rely more heavily on familiarity
as the basis for making the recognition decision. If participants were appropriately
constrained to the picture or word that the decision should have been made upon, then
non-goal related information would not have much of an impact. On the other hand, not
constraining control resources to the appropriate source in making the decision would
instead lead to use of familiarity for deciding the oldness of the test item. Lack of
constraint in the situation where two streams of information are competing for resources
would lead to increased processing of the distracting information resulting in spontaneous
recognition. Thus far, the very limited amount of work done investigating spontaneous
recognition suggests that it tends to occur in conditions in which control processes are
limited as found with divided attention and aging comparisons. However, further
investigation is needed to understand the dynamics between spontaneous recognition and
cognitive control.
Overview of Experiments
The current project aims to establish some of the conditions under which
differential ability to constrain retrieval toward a goal leads to spontaneous recognition of
other information. Little work has been done exploring the conditions under which
spontaneous recognition memory occurs. Additional research exploring these conditions
would further establish whether the „relativity of automaticity‟ pattern that has been
shown in prior work generalizes across conditions where retrieval constraint is
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manipulated. Further understanding this relationship has implications for several areas of
research that incorporate controlled and automatic processing distinctions as discussed
above, including theories of automaticity, retrieval orientation, source constrained
retrieval, involuntary memory, and task switching.
Research most relevant to the current project is the work done by Ste. Marie and
Jacoby (1993) and the prior work done using the memory Stroop paradigm (Anderson et
al., in press). The results from both of these lines will be briefly reviewed in order to
highlight the patterns that are beginning to surface, but to also reveal the limitations and
necessary research to be conducted to further our understanding of spontaneous
recognition.
The Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) experiments found that spontaneous
recognition only occurs under divided attention when there is a match in prior processing
between the target and distracter, given that the target is not easily recognized through
repetition. The prior research using the memory Stroop paradigm showed that divided
attention (in younger adults) and age led to increased spontaneous recognition of
distracters. During the memory Stroop task, participants were instructed to base their
memory decision on either the picture or word component of a stimulus during test and to
ignore the other information. It is possible that the increased spontaneous recognition of
distracters in these groups may have been due to familiarity based responding, such that
decisions were based more on the general “oldness” or fluency of the item, rather than the
particular stimulus type participants were instructed on which to base their decision. This
explanation corresponds with prior results showing increased interference in recognition
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for older adults and divided attention younger adults, both of whom are thought to rely
more heavily on familiarity (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002).
Taken together, the Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) and the memory Stroop
experiments reveal the relationship between decreased ability to control retrieval and
spontaneous recognition. However, a couple of patterns remain unclear. First of all, the
effect that distracter fluency has on spontaneous recognition is ambiguous. The Ste.
Marie and Jacoby study found that spontaneous recognition was less likely to occur when
a 1x presented target was paired with a 5x presented distracter compared to a 1x
presented distracter, showing that increased distracter fluency did not necessarily cause
increased spontaneous recognition. In contrast, the memory Stroop study showed that
new word targets paired with old picture distracters were significantly more likely to
cause spontaneous recognition of the distracter compared to a new picture target paired
with an old word distracter. Further, results showed that pictures were reliably judged
more accurately and quickly than words, suggesting that pictures are more fluent than
words in this task. These results are somewhat contradictory regarding the role that
distracter fluency has on the tendency for spontaneous recognition to occur; an issue that
the current experiments further explore.
Prior work is also unclear regarding the role of retrieval constraint and intention
on spontaneous recognition. Is spontaneous recognition confined to situations in which
familiarity is guiding retrieval, or does it also occur when retrieval is constrained to the
goal information? The recognition decisions made across the Ste. Marie and Jacoby
(1993) experiments did not require participants to intentionally constrain their memory
search to a particular source of information (e.g., heard vs. read list). Rather, participants
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were not informed of the targets being from the same modality and did not report being
aware that target items were from a particular list (read or heard) when questioned after
the experiment. Given these conditions of incidental retrieval, it is uncertain what role
source constrained retrieval has on whether spontaneous recognition occurs and whether
the relativity of automaticity holds under such conditions.
The results from Experiment 2 of the memory Stroop study hint that spontaneous
recognition may not be confined to situations where familiarity is the primary basis for
recognition. This experiment suggests that younger adults may spontaneously recognize
distracters when having to switch between memory decisions on the picture or word
during test. Under these conditions, the interference from distracting information is
likely due to the decreased ability to maintain retrieval constraint on a particular stimulus
type. Retrieval constraint could vary from being tightly constrained to the specific
stimulus type to being loosely constrained to the general oldness of the stimuli. The
demands of having to switch between the targets can be considered to be on controlled
retrieval. The critical difference between this condition and the Ste. Marie and Jacoby
task is that intention is used during retrieval with the memory Stroop task. Attention was
not divided and the instructions were clear regarding what the retrieval goal was during
testing, allowing for controlled retrieval to be used.
It thus remains unclear whether spontaneous recognition only occurs under
conditions in which attention is divided and familiarity drives the memory decision.
Further investigation of this possibility is needed with more thorough methods that allow
constraint or a recollective decision to be in play during memory. This would help
determine whether spontaneous recognition extends to such situations, or if it only occurs
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when one is more reliant on familiarity (as would be the case if attention is divided across
tasks). Testing the generality of spontaneous recognition is important for understanding
the dynamics under which it occurs. This would be informative to theories of recognition
memory and cognitive control. In line with this, testing spontaneous recognition under
conditions in which retrieval constraint is in play explores the extent to which the
“relativity of automaticity” explanation that yielded the occurrence of spontaneous
recognition in prior studies generalizes to conditions in which retrieval constraint and
control is required.
The current thesis aims to shed light on the issues just brought to bear through
three experiments designed to test 1) the extent to which spontaneous recognition occurs
when demands on retrieval constraint are manipulated (as when having to switch between
retrieval goals), 2) how the fluency of target and distracter information affects
spontaneous recognition, and 3) the extent to which spontaneous recognition occurs when
memory is being intentionally directed toward the context that targets (pictures vs.
words) were presented within. Inherent to all of these aims is an attempt to determine
how tractable the relativity of automaticity pattern is across manipulations of fluency and
intentional retrieval of source information.
The experiments implemented an interference paradigm similar to that used in the
preliminary results discussed above that includes target and distracter information
presented simultaneously during testing. The task for the participant was to utilize
instructions and/or cues in making their recognition decision. In all cases, these
instructions and cues are a means to test how different levels of constraint can potentially
influence spontaneous recognition memory. As discussed, spontaneous recognition has
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been demonstrated as a significant influence of an “old” vs. “new” distracter on an “old”
or “new” target decision. This influence can be shown in both accuracy and reaction time
in the forms of both facilitation and interference. More specific rationale, methods, and
expected results will now be described for each individual experiment.
Experiment 1: Pure vs. Mixed Retrieval Constraint
Controlled processing is generally considered to be involved when directing
memory toward source or contextual information and/or avoiding interference from
distracting information (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Yonelinas, 2002). These controlled
processing characteristics are central to voluntary memory, while their relationship with
spontaneous recognition is uncertain. In general, experiments have utilized interference
paradigms in order to influence the ability to use control during memory or attention.
Braver & West (2008) discuss “task switching” studies in the context of other
manipulations used in the domain of executive control and goal maintenance that put
constraints on control such as when dividing attention or placing individuals in a dual
task situation (e.g., Craik, 1982; 1983; Craik & McDowd, 1987; Skinner & Fernandes,
2008).
Research in the area of task switching is generally focused toward better
understanding the mechanisms involved when having to switch between tasks in one‟s
environment. The basic idea is that a “task set” is configured toward goal relevant
information to constrain the information required to fulfill the task demands (De Jong,
Berendsen, & Cools, 1999). Such processes within the memory domain are very similar
to those discussed above regarding retrieval orientation and the controlled process of
constraining memory to a particular source. The task switching approach is particularly
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interesting for current purposes since it involves manipulations that influence level of
constraint while introducing additional factors such as local and global switch costs, task
set coordination, representation, and updating.
Mayr & Kliegl (2000) suggest that the costs of switching from one task set to
another are due to the demands on retrieving the appropriate task rules from LTM. They
found that the demands of switching to tasks requiring the use of episodic information
were significantly greater than the demands of switching to tasks requiring semantic
information. The reason for greater costs from switching to episodic task processing was
the additional retrieval of contextual information used to support such a decision.
Switching between different tasks tends to cause an increase in interference as typically
shown in slowed response time and decreased accuracy. Control is required to
reconfigure to another task set and doing so places higher demands on the system. These
demands may be due to the need to maintain partial activation of both tasks when
switching, as compared to situations wherein a single task goal is maintained.
Across prior experiments done with the memory Stroop task (Anderson et al., in
press), little evidence was found for spontaneous recognition in younger adults with a
blocked test design. In contrast, spontaneous recognition of distracters was found with a
mixed (switching) test design. These results suggest that younger adults might be
susceptible to the influence of distracting information when they have less ability to
constrain to the source of the information as a result of having to switch between making
memory decisions on picture and words.
Experiment 1 tested whether switching between memory sources leads to an
increased tendency to spontaneously recognize non-target information. The rationale is
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that in a switching condition, residual effects of prior target constraint should increase the
demands on control when having to update to a new a target decision. For Experiment 1,
constraint was manipulated via test format (pure vs. mixed). The pure test condition
included separate test blocks in which the recognition decision was made purely on the
picture or the word component. In contrast, the mixed test condition included test blocks
with intermixed recognition decisions. Comparisons between these test conditions yield
evidence for how spontaneous recognition is influenced when switching between test
decisions versus maintaining a task set throughout the test sequence.
Experiment 1 utilized a within subjects design (rather than a between subjects
design), because it allows greater consistency between the pure and mixed condition test
formats, such that cues could be displayed prior to each test item for both conditions.
Further, a within subjects design was thought to increase the cue utilization for the pure
condition given the contrasting mixed condition in which it is necessary to attend to each
cue in order to make the appropriate response. Finally, note that the design for
Experiment 1 differs from preliminary experiments described above, which either
involved pure retrieval blocks (see Table 1) or mixed retrieval blocks (see Table 2).
Participants were expected to show more spontaneous recognition of old
distracters in the mixed compared to the pure condition. Two primary comparisons
(facilitation and interference) were made to determine the amount of spontaneous
recognition of distracters between the conditions. Interference is marked by decreased
accuracy and increased RT when a new target is paired with an old rather than new
distracter. Facilitation is marked by increased accuracy and decreased RT when an old
target is paired with an old rather than new distracter. Both interference and facilitation
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from old distracters are expected to be greater for the mixed test condition. This overall
comparison between conditions will be labeled as global switch costs.
Local switch costs refer to the difference between switch and non-switch trials
within the test phase for the mixed condition. Local switch costs were assessed by
comparing trials that were preceded by a decision on the same stimulus type (non-switch)
to trials that were preceded by a decision on the other stimulus type (switch). It was
expected that switch costs (switch-non-switch trials) would be associated with decreased
accuracy and increased response time.
The overall design was a 2 (test condition: pure, mixed) x 2 (stimulus type:
picture, word) x 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distracter type: old, new) within subjects
design. A schematic of the task and representative stimuli used in the experiment is
shown in Figure 1.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two Washington University students between the ages of 18 and 21, (M =
19.41, SD = .98) participated in this study. Participants were recruited via the
Psychology department subject pool and received either credit or payment for their
participation.
Materials and Design
The experiment included 496 pictures and 496 words. Sixteen of these pictures
and words were assigned to the practice round while the remaining 480 were used in the
experiment proper. The picture material set consisted of pictures courtesy of Michael J.
Tarr, Brown University, http://www.tarrlab.org/ (see Rossion & Pourtois, 2004) as well
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as Wilma Koutstaal, University of Minnesota. These pictures were all single line
drawings of objects without background, shading, or color. The words were selected from
the Elexicon database (Balota et al., 2007; http://elexicon.wustl.edu/). All words were
nouns ranging from 3-8 letters in length and presented in black 20 point Arial font.
Pictures and words were pseudo-randomly paired for the memory test with the
only restriction being that the picture and word were not semantically related. The test
lists were randomly ordered and identical across all participants. The test items were fully
counterbalanced such that each item occurred equally often across participants in each
condition.
The experiment consisted of ten epochs, each of which included a study and test
phase. Each study phase included an intermixed presentation of 24 pictures and 24 words,
with the restriction that no more than three consecutive presentations of the same
stimulus type occurred.
For the test phase, the pure condition included two blocks of 24 items, with one
block testing memory for pictures and the other testing memory for words. The mixed
condition included a single block of 48 items which tested memory for both pictures and
words, with the restriction that no more than three consecutive decisions on the same
stimulus type occurred. For both the pure and mixed conditions, each test block included
an equal number of the test item types (e.g., new target/old distracter) with the condition
that no more than two of the same item type occurred consecutively. The pure and mixed
test conditions were alternated between runs for each subject, and the order of test
conditions was further counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure
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The experiment began with task instructions followed by a brief practice round.
Task instructions informed participants that they would complete a series of study/test
blocks involving pictures and words; that a cue would be shown prior to each test item;
and that during some test blocks these cues would alternate more often than others. Each
of the ten study/test runs began with an instruction screen telling participants to study the
following pictures and words. Study items were then presented one at a time on the center
of the screen for 1.5 seconds with a 500 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI).
Each recognition test phase included an instruction screen informing participants
to pay attention to the cue shown prior to each test item and to base their recognition
decision on that cue for the picture or word. During the pure condition test blocks,
participants were further instructed that all of the following cues would be for the same
stimulus type (pictures or words). The test cues were a “P” or “W” displayed at the
center of the screen for 1 second. The test display was presented immediately following
the cue, and consisted of an old or new picture with an old or new word superimposed in
its center. The test stimulus was randomly presented in one of four slightly off center
quadrants on a white screen. Participants were given up to three seconds to make their
response. After the participant‟s response or the exhaustion of the three seconds, the
screen cleared for an ISI of 500ms and the next test cue was presented. This same
procedure consisting of instructions, study blocks, and test blocks was repeated 10 times
across the experiment with a break occurring half way through. The total time of testing
was approximately 45 to 60 minutes.
Results and Discussion
Overview
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Spontaneous recognition is evidenced by a significant influence of old compared
to new distracters on memory judgments of the target picture or word. The current
experiment sought to determine whether spontaneous recognition would be greater when
making judgments in the mixed test condition than the pure test condition. This
interaction between test condition and distracter type was of particular interest since it
would provide the primary measure of global switch costs on spontaneous recognition.
Local switch costs were also assessed by comparing trials in the mixed condition that
involved a switch vs. non-switch from the former stimulus type decision (picture or
word). The influence of spontaneous recognition on memory performance was assessed
across these factors by separate analyses on hits and false alarms, and on response times
to correct trials. Unless otherwise noted, significance for all reported statistics was p <
.05.
Hits and False Alarms
Spontaneous recognition of old distracters can be seen by either an increase in hits
when responding to old targets or an increase in false alarms when responding to new
targets. Table 3a shows recognition accuracy in the probability of responding “old” to
items as a function of condition (mixed vs. pure), stimulus type (picture vs. word), target
status (old vs. new), and distracter status (old vs. new). Hits are shown on the left and
false alarms on the right side of the table. The analysis of hits (left side of Table 3a)
indicated a non-significant difference between the pure and mixed conditions in overall
hit rate, F < 1. Hit rate was higher for pictures (.80) than for words (.69), F(1, 31) =
26.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .460, and was higher for targets paired with old (.76) compared to
new (.72) distracters, F(1, 31) = 16.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .354.
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Table 3a. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
Stimulus Type, and Test Condition in Experiment 1.

Condition

Mixed
Pure

Mixed
Pure

Old Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

New Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

.75 (.15)
.80 (.18)

Picture Trials
.82 (.15)
.81 (.19)

.08 (.10)
.08 (.09)

.12 (.10)
.10 (.10)

.67 (.19)
.67 (.17)

Word Trials
.72 (.17)
.69 (.20)

.16 (.13)
.12 (.11)

.22 (.14)
.14 (.11)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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The Stimulus Type x Distracter and the Condition x Stimulus Type x Distracter
interactions were non-significant, both F‟s < 1. The Condition x Stimulus-Type
interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 31) = 4.09, p = .052, ηp2 = .117, indicating
that hit rate for words was more closely matched between the pure (.68) and mixed (.69)
conditions, whereas hit rate for pictures was greater for the pure (.81) than mixed (.78)
condition. More importantly, the Condition x Distracter interaction demonstrated that the
increase in hit rate for targets paired with old rather than new distracters was greater in
the mixed condition (.77 vs. .71), as compared to the pure condition (.75 vs. .73), F(1, 31)
= 4.62, p = .039, ηp2 = .130.
The analysis of false alarms (right side of Table 3a) indicated that false alarms
were higher in the mixed (.15) than the pure (.11) condition, F(1, 31) = 15.12, p < .001,
ηp2 = .328; for new words (.16) than for new pictures (.09), F(1, 31) = 20.44, p < .001, ηp2
= .397, and for new targets paired with old (.15) vs. new (.11) distracters, F(1, 31) =
22.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .416. The Condition x Stimulus-Type interaction was also
significant, indicating that false alarms to picture targets was closely matched between
the mixed and pure conditions (.10 vs. .09, respectively), but false alarms to target words
was greater in the mixed than the pure condition (.19 vs. .13, respectively), F(1, 31) =
9.94, p = .004, ηp2 = .243. The Stimulus Type x Distracter and the Condition x Stimulus
Type x Distracter interactions were non-significant, both F‟s < 1.13. Most importantly,
the comparison of spontaneous recognition between the pure and mixed conditions
(Condition x Distracter interaction) demonstrated that the increase in false alarm rate for
targets paired with old rather than new distracters was higher in the mixed condition (.17
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vs. .12), as compared to the pure condition (.12 vs. .10), F(1, 31) = 4.97, p = .033, ηp2 =
.138.
In sum, analyses on both hits and false alarms showed an increased tendency for
spontaneous recognition of old distracters in the mixed as compared to the pure
condition.
Response time
Response time (RT) analyses were restricted to correct responses that were no
more than 3 standard deviations above or below each participant‟s mean RT, resulting in
approximately 1% of correct trials being removed. Analyses on RT were conducted in the
same fashion as accuracy, with separate repeated measures ANOVAs on facilitation (old
targets paired with old vs. new distracters) and interference (new targets paired with old
vs. new distracters) effects across test type and between condition.
As can be seen on the left side of Table 3b, there were large RT differences
between conditions and stimulus type when responding to old targets. Participants were
faster to respond in the pure condition (904 ms) than in the mixed condition (1169 ms),
F(1, 31) = 177.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .852. Participants were also faster to respond to
pictures (954 ms) than to words (1119 ms), F(1, 31) = 106.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .775. The
central comparison of interest between condition and distracter showed a significant
difference, such that participants were more influenced by old compared to new
distracters in the mixed condition (1182 vs. 1156 ms) than in the pure condition (898 vs.
910 ms), F(1, 31) = 7.27, p = .011, ηp2 = .190. All other effects were non-significant, all
F‟s < 1.
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Table 3b. Response Time (in ms) as a Function of Target, Distracter, Stimulus Type, and
Test Condition in Experiment 1.

Condition

Mixed
Pure

Mixed
Pure

Old Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

New Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

1072 (187)
834 (139)

Picture Trials
1095 (214)
816 (113)

1102 (210)
885 (128)

1121 (241)
890 (146)

1239 (220)
986 (137)

Word Trials
1269 (234)
981 (142)

1195 (231)
979 (152)

1275 (269)
1003 (160)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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The analyses on response time for new targets showed a similar pattern to that on
old targets. As can be seen on the right side of Table 3b, participants were faster to
respond in the pure condition (939 ms) than in the mixed condition (1173 ms), F(1, 31) =
102.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .768. Participants were faster to respond to pictures (999 ms) than
to words (1113 ms), F(1, 31) = 74.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .705, and were slower to respond to
new targets paired with old (1072 ms) as compared to new (1040 ms) distracters, F(1, 31)
= 13.21, p = .001, ηp2 = .299. The Stimulus Type x Distracter interaction was also
significant, such that greater interference from old vs. new distracters occurred for words
(1139 ms vs. 1087 ms) than for pictures (1005 ms vs. 993 ms), F(1, 31) = 6.02, p = .020,
ηp2 = .163. Non-significant effects were observed for the Condition x Stimulus Type
interaction, F(1, 31) = 2.59, p = .177, ηp2 = .077, and for the Condition x Stimulus Type x
Distracter interaction, F(1, 31) = 2.49, p = .125, ηp2 = .074. The primary comparison of
interest between condition and distracter showed a significant interaction. Greater
interference occurred from new targets paired with old compared to new distracters in the
mixed condition (1198 vs. 1148 ms) than in the pure condition (946 vs. 932 ms), F(1, 31)
= 6.08, p = .019, ηp2 = .164.
Spontaneous recognition of old as compared to new distracters was associated
with slowing of response time across both new and old target decisions. Slower response
times would be expected for decisions made on new targets paired with old distracters; in
a similar way that Stroop interference occurs when naming a color paired with an
incongruent word (e.g., naming the color “blue” on the word “red”). Further extending
this parallel, one might have expected that an old distracter would have led to speeding,
or facilitation, when judging an old target. However, the response times to old target
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items did not show facilitation when paired with old distracters. Rather, old distracters
were associated with slower response time when participants judged either old or new
target items. The respective pattern of interference and facilitation from spontaneously
recognizing old distracters was observed in accuracy but not in response time. Note that
prior results (Anderson et al., in press) and those to be presented in Experiments 2 and 3
tend to show effects of spontaneous recognition in measures of accuracy rather than
response time. It is possible that greater emphasis on accuracy (e.g., by providing
feedback at test) may have led to greater influence on response time, as is typically
observed in color-word Stroop (MacLeod, 1991). It should also be mentioned that
decisions on picture targets were associated with higher response accuracy and faster
response time. It is possible that this pattern may have been due to the picture superiority
effect (Ally, et al., 2008; Madigan, 1983; Paivio, 1969), such that pictures are more
distinctive than words (also see Dodson & Schacter, 2002).
To summarize briefly, global accuracy and response time analyses showed greater
spontaneous recognition of old distracters in the mixed than in the pure test condition
when judgments were made on old as well as new targets.
Local Switch Costs
Overview
Additional analyses were conducted on switch costs at the local level for the
mixed testing condition. As mentioned above, switch trials were those in which the
preceding trial involved a decision on the other, rather than the same stimulus type (e.g.,
a trial in which the decision was made on the picture target, when the previous trial
involved a decision on the word target). Since switch trials only occurred in the mixed
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condition, analyses were restricted to that condition. This resulted in 2 (Switch Trial:
switch vs. non-switch) x 2 (Stimulus Type: picture vs. word decision) x 2 (Distracter
Type: old vs. new) repeated measures ANOVAs conducted for hits, false alarms, and
response time to old and new targets in the same fashion as for the global differences
presented above. The primary comparisons of interest for all of these analyses was
whether there was a main effect of switch trial, and whether switch trial further interacted
with distracter type and/or stimulus type.
Hits and False Alarms.
The analysis of hits (left side of Table 4a) revealed that hit rate was higher for
non-switch (.76) than for switch (.73) trials, F(1, 31) = 4.56, p = .041, ηp2 = .128. Overall
hit rate was higher for pictures (.79) than for words (.71), F(1, 31) = 11.30, p = .002, ηp2
= .267, and was higher for old targets paired with old (.77) compared to new (.72)
distracters, F(1, 31) = 14.98, p = .001, ηp2 = .326. The Stimulus Type x Distracter and the
Switch Type x Distracter interactions were non-significant, both F‟s < 1.16. The Switch
Type x Stimulus-Type interaction was also non-significant, F(1, 31) = 2.07, p = .160, ηp2
= .063, as was the Switch Type x Stimulus Type x Distracter interaction, F(1, 31) = 2.47,
p = .126, ηp2 = .074.
The analysis of false alarms (right side of Table 4a) yielded a similar pattern of
results to the analysis on hit rate. False alarms were somewhat higher for switch (.16)
than non-switch (.13) trials, but the effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 31) =
4.01, p = .054, ηp2 = .114. False alarms were higher when judging new words (.19) than
new pictures (.09), F(1, 31) = 30.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .498, and for new targets paired with
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Table 4a. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
Stimulus Type, and Switch Type in Experiment 1.

Trial Type

Non-Switch
Switch

Old Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

.74 (.24)
.75 (.16)

Picture Trials
.84 (.17)
.81 (.17)

Word Trials
.74 (.19)
.80 (.13)
Non-Switch
.64 (.22)
.72 (.19)
Switch
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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New Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

.06 (.09)
.09 (.12)

.10 (.13)
.13 (.11)

.17 (.17)
.16 (.14)

.19 (.19)
.23 (.14)

old (.16) vs. new (.12) distracters, F(1, 31) = 10.71, p = .003, ηp2 = .257. No significant
interactions were found, all F‟s < 1.9.
Response Time
Analyses on response time were restricted to correct trials that were within 3
standard deviations of each individual participant‟s mean response rate. As can be seen
in the left side of Table 4b, response time to old targets did not vary much overall.
Response time was slower on switch trials (1184 ms) compared to non-switch trials
(1136 ms), F(1, 31) = 7.39, p = .011, ηp2 = .193. There was also slower overall
responding to words (1248 ms) compared to pictures (1072 ms), F(1, 31) = 55.60, p <
.001, ηp2 = .642. Finally, there was a non-significant difference in RT for old targets
paired with old distracters (1172 ms) compared to new distracters (1148 ms), F(1, 31) =
2.60, p = .117, ηp2 = .077; and no other significant interactions were found, all F‟s < 1.6.
Response times to new trials are displayed in the right side of Table 4b. Response
time was slower on switch trials (1188 ms) compared to non-switch trials (1125 ms), F(1,
31) = 18.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .377. There was also slower overall responding to words
(1213 ms) compared to pictures (1099 ms), F(1, 31) = 59.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .656, and
significantly slower RT for new targets paired with old distracters (1184 ms) compared to
new distracters (1128 ms), F(1, 31) = 15.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .332. This distracter effect
further interacted with stimulus type, such that old vs. new distracters had a greater
influence when judging new words (1258 ms vs. 1169 ms) than new pictures (1112 ms
vs. 1086 ms), F(1, 31) = 5.55, p = .025, ηp2 = .152. No other significant interactions were
found, all F‟s < 1.
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Table 4b. Response Time (in ms) as a Function of Target, Distracter, Stimulus Type, and
Switch Type in Experiment 1.

Trial Type

Non-Switch
Switch

Non-Switch
Switch

Old Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

New Target
New Distracter Old Distracter

1023 (235)
1095 (218)

Picture Trials
1067 (247)
1104 (220)

1057 (217)
1116 (213)

1089 (281)
1134 (241)

1232 (301)
1242 (206)

Word Trials
1222 (272)
1294 (236)

1138 (266)
1201 (245)

1216 (265)
1299 (295)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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To highlight briefly the results on local switch costs, effects were mostly found in
main effects, with switch trials being associated with decreased accuracy in both hits and
false alarms and slower response time to both old and new targets. Further interactions
between switch trials and the variables were not significant. However, a marginally
significant interaction was found between switch type and distracter type such that false
alarms to new targets paired with old distracters were higher on switch than for nonswitch trials. The mixing of task goals likely increased the need to maintain an active
goal set; a process that involves control to constrain retrieval (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000;
De Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999). The increased demands of having to use controlled
processing to maintain retrieval in a switching environment may have led to greater
spontaneous recognition in the mixed compared to the pure retrieval condition. Results
were consistent in showing that the locus of the distracter influence occurred when in a
task set that involved switching between picture and word decisions. Note that the
spontaneous recognition of distracting information was found when assessing the global
or mixing costs of having to alternate between retrieval decisions, but not when assessing
the local or switching costs. These results are consistent with recent studies using task
switching paradigms (Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Rubin & Merian, 2005),
which have shown that mixing cost, but not switching cost, may implicate the
involvement of global or sustained control processes. Thus, the current results suggest
that spontaneous recognition of distracters may be more driven by the global demands to
maintain a task set rather than the within block effects of switch vs. non-switch
interference.
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Taken together, the results from Experiment 1 are consistent with prior results
showing spontaneous recognition for younger adults when attention was divided at test
but not when attention was fully devoted to the task (Anderson, et al., in press; Ste. Marie
& Jacoby, 1993). Thus, the results indicate that spontaneous recognition is more likely
to occur when memory search is less constrained. More generally, the results are also
consistent with those from studies on involuntary autobiographical memory showing that
individuals report memories “popping into mind” when in a non-focused state (Bernsten,
2010; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004).
Experiment 2: Effects of Fluency on Spontaneous Recognition
Experiment 2 examined how the fluency of target and distracter information
effects spontaneous recognition. As discussed above, prior results are mixed regarding
how distracter fluency plays a role in spontaneous recognition. The Ste. Marie and
Jacoby (1993) study found that spontaneous recognition depends on the processing match
between the target and distracter. More specifically, two experiments using a repetition
manipulation during study found that divided attention participants had a greater
tendency to spontaneously recognize a one time (1x) presented distracter than a distracter
presented four times (4x) or five times (5x), when judging a 1x presented target.
Interestingly, those experiments also showed that this relativity pattern was only observed
when participants judged 1x presented targets. Spontaneous recognition did not occur
when judging targets that had previously been studied 4 or 5 times, regardless of the
number of presentations of the distracter.
Prior results from the memory Stroop experiments have shown that picture targets
were recognized more accurately and quickly than word targets. Further, picture
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distracters were somewhat more likely to be spontaneously recognized than words
(Anderson et al., in press). This pattern suggests that pictures may be more fluently
processed than words in this task. Thus, in the memory Stroop experiments, fluency of
the distracter may increase the tendency for spontaneous recognition. It remains unclear
whether spontaneous recognition is more likely to occur for information that is more
fluently processed or if it further depends upon the match in fluency between the target
and the distracter.
Fluency was manipulated by repeating a subset of both words and pictures during
study such that 1x and 3x presented words and pictures were crossed as targets and
distracters during test (see Table 5 for Experiment 2 Item Types below). This design
allowed a test for the effects of fluency on the tendency for distracters to be
spontaneously recognized. Crossing the number of presentations of targets and
distracters also provides a test for the relativity of automaticity, such that matching
number of repetitions (e.g., a 3x target paired with a 3x distracter) can be compared to a
mismatched number (e.g., 3x target paired with a 1x distracter). This would help to
determine whether spontaneous recognition of the distracter is more likely to occur when
there is a match in prior processing.
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Table 5. Experiment 2 Test Item Types

Distracter Type

Target Type
3x

1x

New

3x

3x Target
3x Distracter

1x Target
3x Distracter

New Target
3x Distracter

1x

3x Target
1x Distracter

1x Target
1x Distracter

New Target
1x Distracter

New

3x target
New Distracter

1x target
New Distracter

New target
New Distracter
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Methods
Participants
Thirty-six Washington University students between the ages of 18 and 24 (M =
19.36, SD = 1.36) were included in the current study. Participants were recruited via the
Psychology department subject pool and received either credit or payment for their
participation. Three participants were excluded from the analyses but replaced with
additional participants. Two of these participants had low performance accuracy and/or
response times that were 2.5 standard deviations below the overall mean. The other
excluded participant was noted by the experimenter as not maintaining attention to the
screen during the experiment and rushing through the test blocks.
Materials and Design
The materials, design, and procedure for Experiment 2 were similar to those from
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. First, all of the recognition tests included
mixed decisions on picture and word targets. Second, the study blocks included a
repetition manipulation such that half of the words and half of the pictures were repeated
three times, while the other half were presented once. The space between repetitions was
random with the constraint that no fewer than 3 words or pictures were presented prior to
a repetition. Third, the number of items per study phase was 36 per stimulus type, half of
which were repeated and the other half non-repeated. Fourth, the number of test Item
Types increased to 18 upon crossing number of prior presentations of targets (3x vs. 1x
vs. New) and distracters (3x vs. 1x vs. New) with Stimulus Type (Picture vs. Word
judgment). Each test phase included 54 items, consisting of three of each item type. Test
items were fully counterbalanced across repetition and item type assignment.
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Participants completed seven study-test phases across the experiment, resulting in 21
observations (as compared to 30 in Experiment 1) per item type for each participant.
Results and Discussion
The primary comparisons of interest were 1) whether the pattern found in
Experiment 1 for the mixed condition would replicate under conditions where repetition
was further manipulated 2) whether spontaneous recognition of old distracters increased
when fluency increased via repetition, and 3) whether a relativity pattern would be shown
such that spontaneous recognition would be greater for distracters that matched rather
than mismatched the repetition of the target. Analyses were conducted in a similar
fashion to Experiment 1, with separate repeated measures ANOVAs on hits, false alarms,
and response time to old and new targets. Unless otherwise noted, significance for all
reported statistics was p < .05.
Hits and False Alarms
Table 6a shows recognition accuracy in the probability of responding “old” to items as a
function of stimulus type (picture vs. word), target status (3x, 1x, new), and distracter
status (3x, 1x, new). As can be seen in the first two columns of Table 6a, overall hit rate
was higher for pictures (.79) than for words (.68), F(1, 35) = 39.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .530.
Hit rate was also substantially higher when the target had been presented 3 times during
study (.84) as compared to 1 time (.63), F(1, 35) = 410.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .921. The main
effect of distracter approached significance, F(2, 70) = 2.36, p = .102, ηp2 = .063. Planned
comparisons on Distracter Type yielded a significant difference between 3x (.75) and
new (.72) distracters, p = .03, but non-significant
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Table 6a. Probability of Judging an Item as “Old” as a Function of Target, Distracter,
and Stimulus Type in Experiment 2.
Target
Distracter

3x

1x

New

3x
1x
New

Picture Trials
.91 (.08)
.69 (.16)
.90 (.10)
.70 (.15)
.89 (.08)
.66 (.18)

.13 (.09)
.12 (.11)
.09 (.08)

3x
1x
New

Word Trials
.80 (.15)
.61 (.13)
.78 (.14)
.57 (.15)
.78 (.16)
.56 (.16)

.23 (.18)
.20 (.13)
.17 (.11)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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differences between 3x and 1x (.74), p = .16, and between1x and new distracters, p = .11;
all one-tailed. None of the interactions were found to be significant, with all F‟s < 1.12.
The relativity pattern of interest, in which the match in presentations between
target and distracter would create greater facilitation than repetition alone, was not
observed, as indicated by the non-significant Target x Distracter interaction, F < 1.
Rather, in the current experiment, repetition of the distracter led to slightly greater
facilitation across both 3x and 1x targets. More discussion on potential reasons for not
finding this relativity will be provided below.
As shown in the last column of Table 6a, false alarms were higher when judging
new words (.20) than new pictures (.11), F(1, 35) = 23.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .405. The
interaction between stimulus type and distracter did not reach significance, F < 1. More
importantly, the repetition of distracters during study led to a significant increase in false
alarms to new targets paired with 1x presented (.16) vs. 3x presented (.18) distracters vs.
new (.13) distracter, F(2, 70) = 6.67, p = .002, ηp2 = .160. One-tailed pairwise
comparisons between distracter types all yielded significant effects. There was a greater
amount of interference for new targets paired with 3x vs. 1x distracters (p = .03), and for
3x vs. new distracters (p = .001). There was also a significant interference effect when
comparing new targets paired with 1x and new distracters (p = .03).
Response Time
Analyses on response time were restricted to correct trials that were within 3
standard deviations of each individual participant‟s mean response rate. Analyses on RT
were conducted in the same fashion as accuracy, with separate repeated measures
ANOVAs on old targets and new targets. As can be seen in the first two columns of
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Table 6b, response time was faster for pictures (1014 ms) than words (1188 ms), F(1, 35)
= 101.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .744. Response time was also faster for old targets presented 3x
(1069 ms) than 1x presented targets (1133 ms), F(1, 35) = 46.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .568. No
other effects approached significance, with all F‟s < 1.45.
Response times to new trials are displayed in the last column of Table 6b. As was
found for old targets, response time was faster for pictures (1063 ms) than words (1161
ms), F(1, 35) = 67.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .658. The main effect of distracter was nonsignificant, F(2, 70) = 2.09, p = .131, ηp2 = .056, and the Stimulus type x Distracter
interaction was also non-significant, F < 1.
Note that neither of the response time analyses for Experiment 2 revealed
significant effects from distracter oldness, as found in Experiment 1. This may have been
due to the decreased power, as a result of lower number of observations per cell in
Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1.
In sum, results from Experiment 2 show that repetition of items led to significant
increases in hit rate and RT speed to targets presented 3x vs. 1x during study. Repetition
also led to significant distracter effects as shown by an increased false alarm rate to new
targets paired with a 3x as compared to 1x presented distracters. However, there was
only a marginal effect of distracters on hit rate to old targets. Further, repetition did not
show any increase in facilitation as indicated by the non-significant difference between
1x and 3x distracters on hits. Finally, the relativity pattern of interest was not observed as
indicated by the non-significant interaction between target and distracter repetition.
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Table 6b. Response Time (in ms) as a Function of Target, Distracter, and Stimulus Type
in Experiment 2.
Target
Distracter

3x

1x

New

3x
1x
New

Picture Trials
972 (201)
1045 (202)
993 (178)
1059 (184)
970 (202)
1047 (182)

1064 (169)
1073 (174)
1052 (149)

3x
1x
New

Word Trials
1141 (176)
1228 (211)
1179 (190)
1210 (202)
1161 (205)
1207 (216)

1179 (186)
1157 (163)
1146 (194)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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This lack of relativity effects should be further discussed. It is difficult to
determine how much weight should be given to this null result, in consideration of the
significant effects found in the Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) experiments. Several
methodological differences exist between the current experiment and those from the Ste.
Marie and Jacoby (1993) Experiments (2a and 2b), who found that a 1x presented
distracter was more likely to be spontaneously recognized than a 4x or 5x presented
distracter when judging a 1x presented target. The authors‟ explanation for this
unexpected pattern was that the matching presentations between the 1x target and 1x
distracter provided more correlated attributes than the 1x and 5x distracters. When under
conditions of divided attention, as was the case in the Ste. Marie and Jacoby experiments,
participants are thought to base recognition on familiarity and thus rely more heavily on
such attributes. It is possible that the same pattern of results was not found in the current
experiment because of the difference in the stimuli used. The Ste. Marie and Jacoby
experiments only involved word stimuli, whereas the current experiments involved both
words and pictures.
Thus, the relativity pattern for spontaneous recognition may depend on a certain
amount of overlap in the processing components between target and distracter stimuli.
Perhaps the core factor is not simply the number of presentations of items, but rather, the
match in processing between the items. Experiment 3 was aimed toward investigating
this possibility by using a manipulation that involved a contextual separation by
presenting items in separate lists and providing different instructions to produce more or
less orientation to this overlapping contextual information.
Experiment 3: Effects of Source Constrained Retrieval on Spontaneous Recognition
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The results from Experiments 1 and 2 could be taken to suggest that spontaneous
recognition occurs when retrieval attempts are primarily based on familiarity. However,
further investigation is necessary to explore whether spontaneous recognition also occurs
when attempting to rely upon controlled retrieval. It may be the case that a controlled
retrieval attempt directed toward the source of a target leads to an increased tendency to
spontaneously recognize distracters also belonging to that source. As discussed in the
introduction, prior work has not determined whether the relativity of automaticity
generalizes to situations in which retrieval is intentionally directed toward source
information. Further testing the dynamics of spontaneous recognition under such
conditions is important since it helps to establish whether spontaneous recognition is
contingent upon the participant‟s retrieval goals.
Experiment 3 used a design that involved manipulation of the List source that
targets and distracters were presented in and whether participants were asked to direct
retrieval toward this list source of target items. This design allowed a test for
spontaneous recognition of distracters from the same vs. different source depending upon
how the participant is constrained during test. Participants were shown an intermixed
series of pictures and words during study, as in prior experiments, but study items were
further divided into two separate list contexts (List 1 and List 2). During test, participants
made decisions on items consisting of targets and distracters that were from List 1, List 2,
or new.
Retrieval constraint was manipulated between subjects to determine how
spontaneous recognition might vary based on the particular source of the distracting
information. One condition required participants to constrain retrieval to target items
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from the particular list context (source) that it had been studied in. For the other
condition, participants constrained retrieval to target items studied in either list. Hence,
these conditions are referred to as being either Source Constrained or Source NonConstrained. The Source Non-Constrained condition was akin to that previously used,
such that participants were instructed to make judgments on the cued items (P or W) and
to say “old” if the target was previously studied. For the Source Constrained condition,
participants were instructed only to say “old” if the cued items (P or W) were from a
particular list (List 1 or List 2). That is, the Source Constrained condition demanded that
participants further constrain to the previous list within which targets were presented. The
use of such a manipulation involving constraint to the contextual source of the targets
was based on similar use of direct vs. indirect tests of recognition (e.g., Jacoby, 1991), in
which the requirement to rely on recollection is greater when having to constrain retrieval
to the particular list items were studied in rather than being able to rely on familiarity to
base one‟s decision. Note that in the current experiment, the Source Constrained and
Source Non-Constrained condition differ from the direct and indirect manipulations,
given the assumption that constraint is required to focus on the picture or word target
while disregarding the distracter. In the current experiment, the requirement to constrain
to the particular list that targets were studied in was thought to increase the need to use
recollection beyond making a decision on a picture or word target from either list context.
If source constrained retrieval influences what is spontaneously recognized, then
distracters belonging to the list being constrained should be spontaneously recognized
more than those from the list not being constrained. For example, a recognition decision
on a new target word might be more influenced by an old picture distracter that belonged
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to the same list rather than the other list. Further details on the comparisons of interest are
discussed after a more extensive description of this novel design.
Methods
Participants
Seventy-two Washington University students between the ages of 18 and 22 (M =
19.71, SD = 1.35) were included in this study. Participants were recruited via the
Psychology department subject pool and received either credit or payment for their
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to the Source Constrained or Source
Non-Constrained condition, each of which included 36 participants.
Materials and Design
The methods for Experiment 3 were generally consistent with those from
Experiment 2. However, the design included separate item lists during study along with
changes to test instructions and item types presented at test. The experiment included
two between-subjects conditions that differed in how items should be decided upon at
test. All characteristics of the design including the item types, counterbalancing,
materials, and presentation of items were identical for both conditions. The only
difference between the Source Constrained and Source Non-Constrained conditions was
the instruction given during test regarding whether or not the participant should constrain
retrieval to the particular list the target item was studied in.
The experiment included 8 runs, each including a study and test phase. Each study
phase included two separate lists (List 1 or List 2) with 18 pictures and 18 words per list
presented with the constraint that no more than three consecutive presentations of the
same stimulus type occur. A buffer task (see Procedure below) was administered between
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each study List in order to allow segmentation between study list contexts. Each test
phase included 54 items consisting of target and distracter pictures and words that were
from List 1, List 2, or New (See Table 7 of item types below). Further crossing these
item types with the stimulus type being judged resulted in a total of 18 item types. There
were a total of 24 observations per cell, per participant, across the course of the
experiment.
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Table 7. Experiment 3 Test Item Types.
Target Type

Distracter Type

List 1

List 2

New

List
1

List 1 Target
List 2 Target
New Target
List 1 Distracter List 1 Distracter List 1 Distracter

List
2

List 1 Target
List 2 Target
New Target
List 2 Distracter List 2 Distracter List 2 Distracter

New

List 1 target
New Distracter

List 2 target
New Distracter
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New target
New Distracter

Procedure
The procedure was the same as that used for the other two experiments, except for
the following: 1) Prior to each of the two study blocks, participants were shown a screen
instructing them that the following items would be from “List 1” or “List 2” and to press
the spacebar to begin studying the intermixed presentation of pictures and words. 2) A
brief buffer task consisting of 1 minute of simple math problems was given after each of
the two study blocks. This task presented computations (e.g., “18 - _ = 11”) on the
screen to which the participant entered a numerical response on the keyboard. 3)
Different test instructions were used, depending upon condition assignment: for the
Source Non-Constrained condition participants were instructed to respond “old” to the
picture or the word based on the “P” or “W” cue shown on the screen prior to each test
item. Participants in the Source Constrained condition were further instructed only to say
“old” to the cued item (“P” or “W”) if it belonged to the target list they were instructed to
constrain to. The list being judged in the Source Constrained condition alternated from
List 1 to List 2 half way through each test block, with instructions regarding the
appropriate list to constrain to shown prior to each half. The order of list constraint
during test (List 1 or List 2) was alternated between each run within the experiment (e.g.,
Run 1 test: List 1 for the first half and List 2 for the second half, Run 2: List 2 for the first
half and List 1 for the second half) and was further counterbalanced across participants,
such that half of the participants would constrain to List 1 and then List 2 for the first run,
while the other half of participants would constrain to List 2 and then List 1 for the first
run. Finally, participants were given up to 5 seconds to make their response, rather than
the 3-second response deadline used in the first two experiments. The additional time
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was given to provide participants with ample time to make the more difficult source
constrained decision required in this experiment.
Results and Discussion
As in the prior experiments, spontaneous recognition was evidenced by a
significant influence of old compared to new distracters on memory judgments of the
target picture or word. The primary factor in determining a relationship between sourceconstrained retrieval and spontaneous recognition was the congruence between the list
source that participants were instructed to retrieve items from and the List in which
distracter items were previously studied. Thus, if the participant was instructed to
constrain retrieval to List 1 items, the distracting picture or word from List 1 should be
more likely to be spontaneously recognized compared to distracting items from List 2 or
new distracters. The Source Non-Constrained condition was not given instructions about
the list toward which they were to constrain retrieval. However, the labeling of items as
List 1 or List 2 constrained was made consistent for participants by using the same labels
that were used for the corresponding Source Constrained participants based on
counterbalancing. Assigning these pseudo-labels to the Source Non-Constrained
condition allowed a consistent statistical comparison across conditions.
Three separate sets of analyses were conducted to determine whether retrieval
constraint was associated with greater spontaneous recognition of distracters from the
target source list. These analyses included the probability of responding “old” to 1) old
source target items [items that belonged to the list source that the participant was
instructed to constrain retrieval to], 2) old non-source target items [items that belonged to
the list not instructed to constrain to], and 3) new target items [items that had not been
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studied in either list]. The first set of analyses on old source target items were calculated
as hits for both conditions. The second set of analyses on non-source target items were
calculated as hits for the Source Non-Constrained condition but as false alarms for the
Source Constrained condition. The third set of analyses on new items was calculated as
false alarms for both conditions.
Each set of analyses included a 2 (List constraint: List 1 vs. List 2) x 2 (Stimulus
Type: pictures vs. words) x 3(Distracter: List 1, List 2, New) repeated measures
ANOVA, conducted separately for the Source Constrained and Source Non-Constrained
conditions. Response time analyses on correct responses were also conducted for each of
these comparisons and will be presented after those conducted on accuracy. Unless
otherwise noted, significance for all reported statistics was p < .05.
Recognition Accuracy
Old Source Target Items:
As can be seen in Table 8a, the Source Non-Constrained condition showed a
significant effect of Stimulus Type, with higher accuracy for pictures (.76) than words
(.69), F(1, 35) = 11.52, p = .002, ηp2 = .248. There was a slight, but non-significant
increase in hit rate when old targets were paired with distracters that were from List 1
(.72), and List 2 (.74), compared to new distracters (.71), F(2, 70) = 2.76, p = .07, ηp2 =
.073. Pairwise comparisons on distracter type revealed a marginal difference between
List 1 and List 2 distracters, p = .10, and a significant difference between List 2 and new
distracters, p = .037. All other effects in the ANOVA on hits to old source targets for the
Source Non-Constrained condition were non-significant F‟s < 1.45.
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Table 8a. Probability of Judging Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
.73 (.20)
.76 (.21)
.74 (.19)

.77 (.17)
.78 (.18)
.78 (.18)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
. 67 (.19)
.71 (.17)
.68 (.20)

.71 (.15)
.72 (.19)
.65 (.19)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 8b. Probability of Judging Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
.67 (.18)
.66 (.17)
.69 (.19)

.64 (.16)
.63 (.15)
.63 (.19)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
.57 (.24)
.56 (.21)
.51 (.20)

.52 (.18)
.58 (.20)
.55 (.18)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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An exploratory analysis was conducted to determine whether the slight increase in
facilitation from List 2 distracters may have been driven by a recency effect, such that
List 2 distracters had greater impact when presented in the first rather than second test
block. Only a significant main effect of block was found, with greater overall accuracy in
the first (.76) vs. second (.70) test block, p < .001. More important, the higher facilitation
from List 2 distracters did not depend upon their presentation in the first rather than
second test block.
The Source Constrained condition (see Table 8b) only showed greater overall
recognition of pictures (.65) than words (.55), F(1, 35) = 20.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .371. No
other significant main effects or interactions were found: List x Stimulus Type x
Distracter, F(2, 70) = 1.95, p = .150, ηp2 = .053, List x Stimulus Type, F(1, 35) = 2.13, p
= .153, ηp2 = .057, Stimulus x Distracter, F(2, 70) = 2.03, p = .139, ηp2 = .055, (all other
effects F‟s < 1.1).
In sum, the analysis on old source targets only yielded a statistically significant
effect of Stimulus Type, with picture accuracy being higher than words. There was a
trend toward a significant effect of distracter for the Source Non-Constrained condition,
with post-hoc comparisons yielding a significant facilitation effect from List 2 distracters
compared to new distracters, but a non-significant difference between List 1 and List 2
distracters.
Old Non-Source Targets
The probability of responding “old” to Non-Source targets paired with List 1, List
2, or New distracters when instructed to constrain to List 1 or List 2 is displayed in
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Tables 9a and 9b. Since these targets did not belong to the source list, responding “old” is
considered to be a false alarm for the Source Constrained condition.
The Source Non-Constrained condition (see Table 9a) showed a significant effect
of Stimulus Type, with higher recognition accuracy for pictures (.77) than words (.66),
F(1, 35) = 23.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .400. The interaction between list constraint and
distracter was marginally significant, F(2, 70) = 2.86, p = .064, ηp2 = .075. However,
note that the nature of this interaction is not consistent with that found for the Source
Constrained Condition, since in the Source Non-Constrained condition participants were
not actually instructed to constrain to a particular target list. For List 1 constrained
targets, hit rate was equivalent when paired with List 1 distracters (.73), List 2 (.72), and
New (.73) distracters. However, for List 2 constrained targets, hit rate was matched when
targets were paired with List 1 (.72) and List 2 (.72) targets but lower when targets were
paired with New (.68) distracters. In other words, some overall facilitation occurred from
old distracters for the items designated as being List 2 constrained, but this facilitation
did not differ based on distracter list type. No other significant main effects or
interactions were found: Main effect of List, F(1, 35) = 2.39, p = .131, ηp2 = .064, (all
other effects F‟s < 1.18).
The Source Constrained condition (see Table 9b) had a greater tendency to false
alarm to pictures (.49) than words (.44), F(1, 35) = 5.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .371. There was
also a significant effect of Distracter, F(2, 70) = 5.05, p = .009, ηp2 = .126. Importantly,
there was a trend toward this distracter effect further depending upon the List being
constrained to, as revealed by the marginally significant List x Distracter interaction, F(2,
70) = 2.88, p = .063, ηp2 = .076. The nature of this interaction was consistent with that
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Table 9a. Probability of Judging Non-Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of
Target List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
.78 (.16)
.75 (.20)
.78 (.15)

.77 (.17)
.78 (.15)
.74 (.13)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
.68 (.18)
.68 (.19)
.68 (.17)

.67 (.21)
.66 (.20)
.61 (.24)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 9b. Probability of Judging Non-Source Target Items as “Old” as a Function of
Target List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
.55 (.20)
.50 (.19)
.49 (.21)

.47 (.20)
.49 (.16)
.45 (.19)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
.48 (.17)
.42 (.18)
.42 (.20)

.43 (.21)
.46 (.21)
.41 (.21)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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expected, such that the probability of responding “old” was higher when the distracter
belonged to the list to which participants were instructed to constraint retrieval. Planned
pairwise comparisons revealed that when constraining to List 1, false alarms were
significantly higher for targets paired with List 1 distracters (.51) as compared to List 2
(.46) distracters, p = .002, and New (.45) distracters, p = .01. When constraining to List
2, such that false alarms were greater for targets paired with List 2 distracters (.47) as
compared New (.43) distracters, p = .034. However, the comparison between List 2 and
List 1 (.45) distracters was non-significant, p = .333, and. No other significant main
effects or interactions were found: Main effect of List, F(1, 35) = 2.39, p = .131, ηp2 =
.064 (all other effects F‟s < 1.18).
In sum, the Source Constrained condition showed differential false alarm rates,
based on the list participants were instructed to constrain retrieval. The effect was
marginal (p = .06), but the pattern was consistent for both List 1 and List 2 target items.
The Source Non-Constrained condition did not show any difference in hit rate to List 1
vs. List 2 distracters, but did show partial facilitation effects from List 1 and List 2
distracters compared to new distracters paired with old targets.

New targets

The probability of responding “old” to New Targets paired with List 1, List 2, or
New distracters, when instructed to constrain to List 1 or List 2, is displayed in Table 10a
and 10b. The Source Non-Constrained condition (see Table 10a) only yielded a reliable
difference in the tendency to false alarm to new word targets (.25) as compared to new
picture targets (.14), F(1, 35) = 30.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .468. The Stimulus Type x
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Table 10a. Probability of Judging New Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
.12 (.12)
.14 (.12)
.13 (.13)

.14 (.15)
.12 (.14)
.16 (.14)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
.26 (.17)
.26 (.18)
.24 (.19)

.27 (.20)
.27 (.21)
.22 (.16)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 10b. Probability of Judging New Target Items as “Old” as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
.20 (.16)
.15 (.15)
.15 (.15)

.13 (.18)
.17 (.19)
.12 (.15)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
.25 (.20)
.27 (.20)
.22 (.18)

.22 (.20)
.26 (.21)
.20 (.17)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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Distracter interaction approached significance, F(2, 70) = 2.28, p = .11, ηp2 = .061. The
nature of this interaction indicated that the tendency to false alarm did not differ when
judging new pictures paired with List 1 (.13), List 2 (.13), and New (.14) distracters. In
contrast, false alarms were higher when judging new words paired with old List 1 (.26) or
List 2 (.27) distracters as compared to new distracters (.23). All other effects were nonsignificant, all F‟s < 1.55.
Participants in the Source Constrained condition (see Table 10b) had a greater
tendency to false alarm to new targets when instructed to constrain to List 1 (.21) than
List 2 (.18), F(1, 35) = 6.13, p = .02, ηp2 = .149. False alarms were also higher for new
word targets (.24) than picture targets (.15), F(1, 35) = 12.73, p = .001, ηp2 = .267. The
main effect of distracter was also significant, F(2, 70) = 4.52, p = .01, ηp2 = .114.
Pairwise comparisons between distracter types showed significant differences between
New distracters (.17) and List 1 distracters (.20), p = .033, and between New and List 2
distracters (.21), p = .003; but a non-significant difference between List 1 and List 2
distracters, p = .14, all one-tailed.
The main interaction of interest, between distracter and list constraint yielded a
marginally significant difference, F(2, 70) = 2.49, p = .09, ηp2 = .067. The nature of this
interaction was fairly consistent with that expected. When participants were instructed to
constrain to List 1, false alarms were somewhat higher for new targets paired with List 1
(.22) distracters, as compared to New (.18) and List 2 (.21) distracters. Similarly, when
instructed to constrain to List 2, there was a slightly higher tendency to false alarm to
new targets paired with List 2 (.21) distracters as compared to New (.16) or List 1 (.17)
distracters. All other effects were non-significant, with all F‟s < 1.42. Response Time
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Response time analyses were conducted in a similar fashion to the analyses
conducted on accuracy. Separate analyses were conducted for the Source Constrained
and Source Non-Constrained conditions, for Old Source Target items, Non-Source Target
items, and for New Target items paired with List 1, List 2, or New distracters. All of the
following analyses were restricted to correct response trials that fell within 3 standard
deviations of each individual participants‟ average response time.
To anticipate, the bulk of the analyses on response times did not reveal any
consistent patterns across the comparisons for source, non-source, and new targets. There
was generally faster response time to pictures compared to words, which was expected.
The Source Constrained condition also showed marginal facilitation effects from List
congruent picture distracters paired with old source word targets and showed significant
overall interference from old distracters when judging new targets. Note that the response
times were also explored by analyzing standardized response times, given the high degree
of variability. This analysis converted each individual‟s RT into a standardized (z) score
based on their overall mean and standard deviation (see Faust, Balota, Spieler, Ferraro,
1999) and focuses the analyses on differences across conditions for each individual while
controlling for individual differences in baseline response time. Analyses on the z-score
transformed RT‟s yielded the same pattern as those reported for mean RT
Old Source Target Items
The analysis of response times to old source targets (see Table 11a) in the Source
Non-Constrained condition only revealed a significant List x Stimulus Type interaction,
F(1, 35) = 8.78, p = .005, ηp2 = .20. Participants were somewhat faster to respond to
pictures from List 2 (1073) than List 1 (1136), but slightly slower to respond to words
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from List 2 (1347) than List 1 (1321). The main effect of distracter approached
significance, F(2, 70) = 2.52, p = .106, ηp2 = .067, and post-hoc pairwise comparisons
between distracter types all yielded non-significant differences. All other effects were
also non-significant, F‟s < 1.59.
The analysis on the Source-Constrained condition‟s response times to old source
targets (see Table 11b) revealed a significant interaction between list, stimulus type, and
distracter, F(2, 70) = 4.79, p = .011, ηp2 = .120. To examine this interaction, separate 2x3
ANOVAs on distracter and list were conducted for the picture and word judgments. For
the picture judgments, no significant main effect or interaction was found, all F‟s < 1.68.
In contrast, the analysis of word judgments revealed a significant List x Distracter
interaction, F(2, 70) = 3.49, p = .036, ηp2 = .091. Further analyses were conducted
separately for List 1 and List 2 word targets paired with List 1, List 2, or New picture
distracters. When constraining to List 1 source target words, response times were
somewhat faster for targets paired with new pictures (1366) compared to List 1 (1422)
and List 2 (1472) pictures, although this effect was non-significant, F(2, 70) = 1.84, p =
.166, ηp2 = .05. Pairwise comparisons on distracter type also yielded non-significant
differences. When constraining to List 2 source target words, response times were fastest
for targets paired with List 2 (1352) compared to List 1 (1439) and New (1438) picture
distracter, although this effect was also non-significant, F(2, 70) = 1.90, p = .157, ηp2 =
.052. Pairwise comparisons between distracter types yielded non-significant differences,
although the comparison between List 2 and New distracters approached significance, p =
.062.
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Table 11a. Response Time (in ms) to Source Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
1119 (415)
1104 (297)
1184 (325)

1085 (241)
1034 (316)
1100 (327)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
1356 (383)
1307 (318)
1300 (301)

1367 (392)
1324 (346)
1350 (391)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 11b. Response Time (in ms) to Source Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
1263 (404)
1227 (358)
1274 (417)

1263 (460)
1327 (458)
1282 (461)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
1422 (519)
1472 (484)
1366 (464)

1439 (510)
1352 (516)
1438 (504)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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Old Non-Source Targets
The analysis on response times to old non-source targets for the Source Non-Constrained
(see Table 12a) condition only yielded a significant difference between response time to
pictures (1092) and words (1325), F(1, 35) = 85.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .710. All other effects
were non-significant, all F‟s < 1. Response time analyses on old non-source targets did
not yield any significant differences for the Source Constrained condition (see Table
12b), all F‟s < 1.68.
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Table 12a. Response Time (in ms) to Non-Source Target Items as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in
Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
1084 (309)
1087 (274)
1103 (244)

1104 (266)
1094 (281)
1078 (255)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
1300 (330)
1310 (272)
1321 (327)

1341 (352)
1351 (382)
1327 (375)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 12b. Response Time (in ms) to Non-Source Target Items as a Function of Target
List, Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
1382 (496)
1327 (511)
1394 (488)

1317 (569)
1436 (490)
1358 (612)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
1398 (535)
1365 (458)
1374 (427)

1423 (572)
1376 (585)
1434 (595)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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New Targets
The analyses on the Source Non-Constrained condition response times to New
Targets (see Table 13a) revealed that response times to pictures (1165) was faster than
words (1339), F(1, 35) = 42.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .547. There was also a significant main
effect of List constraint, with response times to List 1 (1267) slower than List 2 (1237),
F(1, 35) = 4.30, p = .045, ηp2 = .109. Again, note that this condition did not actually
constrain to a particular list source, making this effect difficult to interpret. All other
effects were non-significant, F‟s < 1.69.
The analyses on the Source Constrained condition response times to New Targets
(see Table 13b) indicated that response time was faster when responding to pictures
(1228) than to words (1319), F(1, 35) = 18.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .346. Response time also
differed according to Distracter type, F(2, 70) = 8.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .202. Pairwise
comparisons between the List 1 (1273), List 2 (1313), and New (1235) distracters yielded
significant differences for all comparisons, all p‟s < .045, two tailed. All other effects
were non-significant, F‟s < 2.14.
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Table 13a. Response Time (in ms) to New Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Non-Constrained Condition in Experiment
3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
1154 (199)
1213 (256)
1178 (258)

1154 (275)
1136 (248)
1155 (253)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
1382 (365)
1359 (316)
1316 (371)

1335 (327)
1309 (329)
1331 (388)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 13b. Response Time (in ms) to New Target Items as a Function of Target List,
Distracter, and Stimulus Type for the Source Constrained Condition in Experiment 3.
Target
List 1

List 2

Distracter
List 1
List 2
New

Picture Trials
1215 (359)
1238 (345)
1167 (335)

1230 (451)
1285 (424)
1236 (411)

List 1
List 2
New

Word Trials
1352 (398)
1371 (454)
1252 (404)

1294 (477)
1361 (494)
1286 (432)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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The results from Experiment 3 were somewhat consistent with the proposed
hypotheses, with greater influence from distracters from the list being constrained to for
the Source Constrained condition compared to the Source Non-Constrained condition.
The Source Non-Constrained condition was not instructed to constrain memory to a
particular list source and was expected to yield facilitation and interference effects that
had previously been observed. While there are several limitations and caveats to the
results of Experiment 3, in general, the pattern of results was somewhat consistent with
those expected, showing marginally significant facilitation effects from old distracters
when judging old targets and significant interference effects from old distracter pictures
when judging new words. More importantly, the Source Non-Constrained condition did
not show differential effects from distracters that were previously studied in List 1 vs.
List 2. However, the Source Constrained condition did provide partial evidence in
support of the relativity pattern. Marginally significant List Constraint x Distracter
interactions were observed in which interference was higher for distracters belonging to
the list being constrained to when these judgments were made to non-source targets (p =
.06), and new targets (p = .09).
It should be noted that this experiment was very exploratory in nature and there
are potential problems to consider. First, the Source Constrained condition showed a high
false alarm rate to Non-source target items. This suggests that the participants may have
had difficulty constraining to the appropriate source list. Such difficulty in constraining to
the correct source list may have been due to the segmentation of the 2 list contexts being
ineffective. Lists were only separated in time and with a brief buffer task. Perhaps a
blocked study format for each stimulus type or a smaller number of items per list would

72

have freed more resources to think effectively back to the appropriate context being cued.
Further, constraint demands may have also been increased by the design used, which
alternated the order of List 1 vs. List 2 constraint from run to run. It is possible that such
a design may have led to some confusion for the participant about which List they should
be constraining to. A set sequence, involving List 1 decisions followed by List 2
decisions may have decreased demands for participants. Another possible manipulation
may have been to tie the context to the items more effectively via some kind of
processing overlap such as using different judgment tasks for the two lists.
The memory Stroop task is assumed to place demands on cognitive resources
when switching between picture and word targets. The additional requirement to
constrain selectively to loosely discriminable list contexts may have overextended
resources. Further, it is possible that source confusion may have occurred for the stimulus
type on which the participant was attempting to make their decision. However, these
possibilities do not fully explain the increased tendency toward distraction for items
belonging to the source toward which participants were attempting to orient memory. The
pattern found is consistent with the relativity of automaticity, which will be more
thoroughly discussed along with the results from Experiments 1 and 2 in the following.
General Discussion
Spontaneous recognition was investigated in the current studies by using the
Memory Stroop paradigm, which provided an indirect measure of spontaneous
recognition by assessing the influence of old vs. new distracters on target recognition.
The approach taken toward understanding the phenomenon of spontaneous recognition
was to manipulate factors thought to influence the ability to constrain retrieval to goal
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relevant information. The rationale for taking this approach was guided by prior
experimental research showing that spontaneous recognition tends to occur when
controlled processing is compromised (Anderson, et al., under review; Ste. Marie &
Jacoby, 1993) and by diary studies on autobiographical occurrences of involuntary
memory which suggest that such memories have a tendency to occur when in a nonfocused state (Berntsen, 2007). A central premise of the current studies was that the
seemingly automatic occurrences of spontaneous recognition may depend upon the way
that control is being directed (i.e., the relativity of automaticity).
As hypothesized, spontaneous recognition occurred more often when there was
decreased ability to constrain retrieval. This was most clearly evidenced by the results
from Experiment 1, wherein a switching manipulation showed that spontaneous
recognition occurred when having to alternate between decisions to the picture vs. the
word component, but not when participants made consistent decisions to the same
stimulus type. Consistent results were also found in Experiments 2 and 3, but the pattern
of results in those experiments were somewhat more complex. For Experiment 2,
significant interference effects were found from old as compared to new distracters.
Further, distracters that were repeated had a greater influence than non-repeated
distracters on false alarms to new targets. However, reliable facilitation effects on old
target hit rate were only found in the comparison between repeated distracters as
compared to new distracters. Taken together, the results from Experiment 2 suggest that
the increased fluency of distracting information is generally associated with an increased
tendency for spontaneous recognition. For Experiment 3, marginal facilitation effects
were found for the Source Non-Constrained condition across old target items, and
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significant interference was found when judging new target words paired with old
distracter pictures. The Source Constrained condition did not yield facilitation effects but
did show interference effects when judging non-source and new targets paired with old
rather than new distracters.
The overall pattern of results across the three experiments suggest that conditions
that place demands on the ability to use controlled retrieval are associated with an
increased tendency to spontaneously recognize distracting information. These findings
are consistent with prior results found by Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) and Anderson et
al. (in press) who found spontaneous recognition for younger adults under conditions of
divided attention but not when attention was fully devoted to the task.
The notion of source-constrained retrieval provides a useful way of understanding
the conditions in which spontaneous recognition may be more likely to occur. When
retrieval is constrained by source information, the early selection of relevant information
prevents the influence of irrelevant information on memory judgments. In contrast, a less
constrained retrieval orientation involves increased processing of the irrelevant or
distracting information (e.g., Jacoby, et al., 2005; Jacoby, Kelley, & McElree, 1999;
Marsh et al., 2009). When participants were able to maintain a consistent retrieval
orientation toward the same source of information, spontaneous recognition of distracters
was less likely to occur, as found for the pure testing condition in Experiment 1.
However, when participants were less able to constrain to source relevant information
during test as a result of having to switch between retrieval orientations, there was an
increased tendency for spontaneous recognition.
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Note that the results found in the current experiments may not have been purely
due to the decreased ability to constrain retrieval to source relevant information. Rather,
it is possible that the distracting stimuli may have had their influence via drifts in
attentional focus or goal monitoring processes. While the current results are not able
tease apart these components, further work could shed light on these possibilities by
incorporating a further manipulation that would separate out responses made to the
picture vs. the word target items. The design could involve a separate “old/new” button
response to the picture targets and “old/new” button response to word targets. As such, it
would be possible to separate out source error responses (e.g., mistakenly a recognition
decision to the word, when cued to respond to the picture) from responses that were
correctly made to the word target, for example. Thus, spontaneous recognition in such a
design would be assessed by comparing the influence of old vs. new distracters on
correctly designated source decisions, while controlling for cases when the participant
was mistakenly responding to the incorrect target stimulus as a result of inefficient cue
utilization.
The dynamics between retrieval constraint and spontaneous recognition were
further explored in Experiments 2 and 3. The relativity of automaticity pattern would
have been supported in Experiment 2 by increased spontaneous recognition from
distracters that matched the number of prior presentations of the target item being judged.
Most intriguing would have been the effect from a 1x presented distracter having greater
influence than a 3x presented distracter on a 1x presented target, a pattern that was
observed in the Ste. Marie and Jacoby studies. However, the results from Experiment 2
did not fit this pattern. Rather, the influence from repeated distracters was only found in
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interference, and the degree of facilitation from either 3x or 1x presented distracters did
not interact with relative target presentation.
The general pattern of results found in Experiment 3 was partially in line with the
relativity of automaticity. The source-constrained condition showed trends toward
significantly greater influence from distracters that belonged to the same, rather than
different, list to the target participants were instructed to constrain to. In contrast, the
Source Non-Constrained condition did not show differential influence from distracters
belonging to the same list as the target. However, several limitations regarding the design
of Experiment 3 should be considered prior to drawing firm conclusions about whether
the relativity of automaticity pattern and generalizes to contexts involving voluntary
search toward source information. Thus, more work is necessary to determine whether
top-down or goal relevant search processes influence the type of distracting information
that may be processed.
Prior results from Ste. Marie and Jacoby (1993) also suggest that task orientation
may set the context for the differential effects of distracters belonging to the same vs.
other source of information. In those experiments, stimulus modality was manipulated
such that heard targets could be surrounded by read, heard, or new distracters
(Experiment 4a) and read targets could be surrounded by read, heard, or new distracters
(Experiment 4b). In both experiments, the distracters belonging to the same modality to
that being tested caused greater spontaneous recognition than the other modality.
Interestingly, post-experiment questioning from those studies revealed that none of the
participants claimed to have noticed the homogeneity of old targets being tested. The
authors suggested that participants may have adopted an “unconscious set” during
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retrieval, in which the divided attention conditions led to greater reliance on correlated
attributes between the target and distracter. Thus, the testing conditions used in those
experiments may have facilitated the processing of distracters belonging to the same
modality as the targets, despite the participants‟ lack of awareness for the source of the
target information.
Results from Experiment 3 suggest that spontaneous recognition of source
congruent distracters may not necessarily be limited to situations in which attention is
divided and familiarity is used to guide retrieval. Rather, a goal driven attempt to retrieve
information from a particular source showed a trend toward spontaneous recognition of
distracters belonging to that source. The common denominator across this study and that
by Ste. Marie and Jacoby is the role of a task set in determining the type of information
that is processed. It seems that a task set may influence distraction in cases in which
retrieval processing is allocated more automatically, as well as in cases in which retrieval
processing is allocated in a more controlled or intentional manner. Further work is
necessary to determine whether spontaneous recognition of source relevant distracters is
more likely when information is contextually bound in a way that allows more efficient
constraint to source relevant information.
The relationship between spontaneous and directed processes is pervasive across
research conducted on attention, recognition memory, and involuntary autobiographical
memory. Neumann (1984) suggested that automatic processes are not independent of
one‟s current attentional state, based on research indicating that the engagement of
seemingly automatic motor behavior depends upon higher order processes of motor
planning. Research investigating selective attention has revealed similar patterns. Folk,
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Remington, and Johnston‟s (1992) theory on the contingent orienting of attention also
states that an attentional set establishes the type of information that may be selectively
attended to in one‟s environment, and that capture from distracting information often
occurs when the target and distracting information share features that are relevant to the
current task demands (also see Lavie, 2005; Ruz & Lupiáñez, 2002). Finally, involuntary
autobiographical memory research implicates a connection between the current goal state
or task engagement of an individual and the nature of the involuntary memory retrieved
(e.g., Ball & Little, 2006; Berntsen, 2010). Thus, the results found across these domains
and the current results implicate a contingency between top-down orientation and the
type of information that involuntarily captures attention/memory.
The current experiments investigated spontaneous recognition in a context
wherein memory was actively being directed toward target information. More generally,
involuntary memory in daily life has been reported to occur across a wide variety of
contexts that vary in the extent to which memory is actively engaged in the ongoing task
(e.g., Ball & Little, 2006). Involuntary memory has been described by others as suddenly
“popping” into mind (e.g., Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004) during situations when it is
not evident that the individual was in a “retrieval mode” (see Tulving, 1985). These
observations suggest that involuntary memory may be more obligatory in nature. Thus,
research might be directed toward determining whether similar results would have been
found if individuals were not actively engaged in a memory task. Such a manipulation
might produce similar results to those previously found using the memory Stroop
paradigm, wherein decreased use of cognitive control during that task would lead to
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increased likelihood of processing other information in the environment. This conjecture
requires further investigation.
To what extent was spontaneous recognition accompanied by awareness of the
source of the feeling of familiarity? In more naturalistic cases (e.g., Berntsen, 2007;
2010), involuntary memory often involves recollection of episodic details. The
spontaneous recognition memory that is measured by the current procedures may be
somewhat different from these naturalistic occurrences. The latter typically leads to
awareness of the source of the familiarity (e.g., recognizing an acquaintance) whereas an
influence of spontaneous recognition in a flanker task or a Stroop-like task might arise
without people being aware of the source of the influence. However, such awareness of
the source may not be required for effects of spontaneous familiarity. For example,
Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) found that participants were more likely to falsely
recognize words when the same word (i.e., a context word) had been flashed immediately
before the target of the recognition judgment. The preceding context word created a false
sense of familiarity for the new target word, yet participants were unaware that the
context word had been flashed. These results suggest that spontaneous familiarity may
influence recognition memory even when participants are not aware of its source. In the
current study, it is conceivable that the oldness of the distracting information may have
been misattributed to the target being judged without participants‟ awareness of the
source of oldness. In contrast, participants may have been aware of the oldness of the
distracting items but unable to avoid the unwanted influence of this familiarity on target
judgments. Along this line, it is interesting to note that when response times did yield
reliable effects, the oldness of a distracter was associated with slowed responding for
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responses to both old and new targets. A speculative possibility is that this slowing may
have been associated with participants‟ awareness of old distracters.
Further research is needed to address the issue of awareness in spontaneous
recognition. The awareness of distracters could be assessed via post experiment
questionnaires designed to gauge the degree to which participants were aware during the
task (e.g., Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner; 1995; Ste. Marie & Jacoby, 1993). Another
possibility would be to test participants‟ subsequent memory for distracters that were
shown during test (see Jacoby, et al., 2005). In this case, higher recognition for the
previously shown as compared to novel distracters would suggest that participants were
aware of the distracters to the extent that further processing of the distracters had
occurred.
In conclusion, spontaneous memory is common in daily life (Rubin & Berntsen,
2009) but rarely studied in the laboratory (e.g., Anderson et al., in press; Mace, 2006; Ste.
Marie & Jacoby, 1993). The current studies tested the dynamics of spontaneous
recognition within an experimental setting, allowing manipulations on ability to maintain
retrieval goals, the fluency of targets and distracters, and the extent to which intentional
retrieval was oriented to source information. Spontaneous recognition was more likely to
occur when retrieval constraint was made difficult as a result of having to alternate
between decisions to different components in the environment. The results also suggest
that the type of information that is spontaneously recognized seems to be partially
regulated by one‟s retrieval orientation toward source information. Further insight into
the elusive phenomenon of spontaneous recognition might be gained by considering how
cognitive control sets the stage for its occurrence.
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